[151 cont.]
175 raids of the Kazaks. The Volga Kalmuks, the Bashkirs, and
721 the Siberian Cossacks began to attack again with more strength
726 than ever. Galdan Tsyren could not watch the ruin of the old enemies of his people with composure, nor leave unavenged the aggressions and wrongs which his ancestors had been obliged to endure for more than a century. After having delivered several terrible blows against them, he [152] seized Turkestan, the capital of their khans, in 1723 (1), in addition to Tashkent and Sairam,

> 1. Nepluev and Rychkov, in their reports written from Orenburg to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, often say that Abulkhair lived in Turkestan until 1723, at which time he was driven out by the Dzungars.

and finally he brought several branches of the Great Horde and the Middle Horde completely under his rule.

[722] A similar fate awaited all the other Kirghiz-Kaisaks [Kazaks], who were pressed and pursued from all sides, and they might have been completely exterminated if they had not retreated to the south. The remnants of the Great Horde and a small part of the Middle Horde fell back toward Khodzhent /Leninabad/, most
175 of the Middle Horde retreated to Samarkand, and the Little Horde
● 167 moved to Khiva and the realm of Bukhara (2). These migrations
731

> 2. This is what the famous elder of the Middle Horde, Bukenbai, said to Tevkelev when they met in Orsk in 1748, and he added: "At that time we fled before the Kalmuks, the Siberian and the Yaik /Ural/ Cossacks, and the Bashkirs like hares before the hounds."

brought inevitable ruin and disaster in their wake. The herds and the studs dwindled from one day to the next, and misfortune and misery befell everyone, some died of hunger, and others abandoned

[152 cont.]

175 their wives and children. Finally, the fugutives halted, but in
● [167 barren localities offering no support to a nomadic people. It
731] was impossible for the Kazaks to endure such an unhappy situation for long. Of the two scourges which menaced them, it was best to choose the one which promised some advantages, if not for the present at least for the future. Despair drove them to make themselves masters of their old territories, which they could not do without. Danger had snuffed out the flame of dissension and replaced it with unanimity of sentiment, and the efforts of all
[643] were directed to the same end. It was decided in a general assembly of the people to advance, attack the common enemies, and drive them from the lands of the Kazaks. This undertaking was sanctified at once by a common oath to remain faithful to
[643 each other. Khan Abulkhair was chosen as [153] leader of the
782] nation, and the sacrifice of a white horse (1), which was made

1. See the article on "Customs" in the statistical section of this book, for more details. [Not translated.]

according to the custom of this people, was considered a pledge of future peace.

[726] After these preparations the Kazaks advanced, attacked the Dzungas, and won a number of battles against them, and re-
[727] covered their old lands. But as they expected new attacks from Galdan Tsyren, they found it more opportune to move away from this dangerous neighbor, and some retreated to the north, while others moved westward. Only the Great Horde remained near the Dzungars, and they submitted to the latter almost in entirety, as we shall soon see. The Little Horde did not stop at the Emba
175 River, which was formerly the border, when they arrived there,
166 but crossed over to the right bank and attacked the Volga
726 Kalmuks, and after seizing a large part of their pasture lands, they moved all the way to the Ural River. The Middle Horde moved north to the Ori and the Ui, and drove out many Bashkirs from the vicinity of these rivers. Although the strength of the

[164 cont.]
x 48 foreign domination. In 1814 this territory became the property of the khan of Kokand, and the Kazaks were also obliged to submit themselves to this new master. Even on this occasion some of them proved how difficult it is to control a nomadic people against its will. Those branches which were in the neighborhood
● [167] of the town of Chimket /Chimkent?/ abandoned their arable fields and even their gardens and retreated toward the Chinese border (1).

1. See the memoirs of Nazarov, who was sent to Kokand in 1813 and 1814, p. 34.

The result of what we have said above is that the Great Horde does not form any whole. One part is obedient to China, another to the khan of Kokand, and a third is regarded as independent. Several thousand tents of the last group, which was camping on the site of Semrek [Semirechye] (the seven rivers) as well as near the Kuk-Su and Kara-Tal rivers and close to the Chinese border were recognized as Russian vassals in 1819, under the command of Siuk, son of Khan Ablai.

In addition some Kazaks of the Great Horde have left the steppes altogether to become settled in one spot within the Russian borders. This was how Sultan Churigei was received with 4,000 Kazak tents of both the Great and the Middle Hordes. He received a concession of lands near the fort of Ust-Kamenogorsk, by ukase of the Empress Catherine II of February 28, 1789.

[165] Likewise, in 1793, Tugum, sultan of the Great Horde, petitioned to become a subject immediately, forever, with a hundred tents of his subjects who had actually crossed over the border into Siberia.

[193 cont.]
of 1741 gave reason to doubt the sincerity of their demonstrations and promises. We said above that Karasakal, chief of the Bashkir [167] rebels, had retreated to the Kazak hordes. It is not known which khan or sultan took him under protection, but it is recognized that having announced himself to be the brother of Galdan Tsyren, the general of the Dzungars, he went out and laid waste the settle- [726] ments of the latter people at the head of a large number of armed Kazaks. Galdan had been warned of this attack and sent to punish these brigands an army of 15,000 men, who pursued them [727] almost to Orenburg across the Kazak steppe and devastated the auls in their path, killing or taking away men and livestock. The subjects of Abul Mahmet and Ablai suffered most from this situation, which causes one to suppose that they had supported Karasakal and aided him, and that this had brought down all these misfortunes upon them. The swift advance of the Dzungars was stopped by the commander of Orenburg, who saw them approaching the border and sent word to them that they were violating the peace which existed between Russia and Galdan Tsyren. The head of the Dzungarian army withdrew at once, after declaring that neither he nor his master had been informed of the submission of the Kazaks to Russia, and that these peoples had made all their neighbors lose patience with them because of their constant brigandage. They were told that in future they should address their [194] complaints about the Middle and the Little Hordes to the Russian government and not take justice into their own hands. It can be imagined that neither Galdan nor his general could understand the justice of this diplomatic solution, and that they continued to act toward the new Russian subjects as they had during their independence.

This event made Abul Mahmet request the Russian government to erect a fortified city in the midst of the grazing lands of the Middle Horde. He knew that a similar promise had been made to Abulkhair, and he considered himself worthy of being treated on the same footing.

[726] Although the Kazaks had been given a strong lesson by the Dzungars, a still more terrible storm menaced them from the

[239 cont.]
[648] died, he was obliged to send another at once to take his place,
[661] but he delayed and thought of weak excuses, and finally the local
[343] authority received an order not to force him. It was also ordered that sheds and enclosures be built near the Ural River for him and his brothers, at the expense of the crown, for the wintering of their animals. Finally the Khan and the most distinguished sultans received many gifts at this time.

[728] In order to calm all the Kazaks in the north and to protect them from attacks which could have stopped them even during their preparations to march against the Chinese, the strictest prohibitions were repeated to prevent the Bashkirs from crossing the Ural River.

[343] Certain difficulties which arose in building the livestock enclosures for the Khan and the sultans, their constant requests that they be allowed to spend the winter in the steppes of Astrakhan, and the fear that this concession might bring about the destruction of the Volga Kalmuks, led the government to return, in 1759, to the idea of building a city at the mouth of the Emba. It was thought that even if the Khan and the Kazaks could not be persuaded to live there permanently, at least they would not refuse to spend the winter there in order to care for their studs and livestock. However this plan has remained [240] unrealized to this day, like the one of which we spoke above.

After Amursan's death and the cessation of the unpleasant relations which had taken place concerning him between the Russian and Chinese governments, Russia's preparations to repel an attack by the latter, as well as the aid promised by Khan Nurali and Sultan Ablai, became unnecessary. Nevertheless the Russian court continued to fear for a long time that the Kazaks might
● [167] withdraw across the borders into the ravaged lands of Dzungaria. Because of Ablai's ties with China and the efforts of the Chinese to draw him into their vicinity, the Middle Horde even seemed disposed to change its place of habitation. It was supposed that if it withdrew eastward, the Little Horde would also follow its example.

[577] Such an emigration could not harm Russia with regard to her security, for the Kazaks, after becoming her subjects, had

[242 cont.]

x 648 These moods were constantly increasing the audacity of the Little Horde, and the Khan pleaded as an answer the weakness [579 685] of his power. In this situation an order was sent from St. Petersburg (1) to require the Kalmuks to return the horses they had stolen

1. Ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of July 18, 1760.

and to punish the raids of the Kazaks by sending troops into their lands to find the offenders and to seize their possessions, or at least to arrest their kinsmen. But this was to be done without touching, under any circumstances, those who were strangers to them.

[721] In 1761 part of the Little Horde attacked the Russian borders again and was again punished by force of arms. The reason for its attacks was the same as that for the year before. The Kalmuks had not returned the stolen horses, and the courtesies which were owed them had not been shown to the Khan and his brothers in Orenburg, although at the beginning of the year they had not taken part in the raids. In the autumn the Sultans Erali and Aichuvak were [579] in such a state of outrage at the behavior toward them [243] that they began to halt the caravans which were returning to Orenburg. Aichuvak even had the intention of withdrawing with the ● [167] Semirod descent line toward the Chinese border into the lands which had belonged to the Dzungars. In order to keep these two [661] sultans as well disposed toward Russia as they had been earlier, the higher authorities granted annual stipends to each of them in spite of the conduct of the local authorities in Orenburg.

x 648 Because of this state of affairs in the Little Horde and the ambiguous position held by Sultan Ablai, which nevertheless was not harmful to Russia, when Emperor Peter III was elevated to the throne, the Khan and the principal Kazak sultans were sent [662] letters with this information without demanding a new oath from them. It was believed that they would have refused, and it was decided not to carry out this formality until they should be in Orenburg themselves. In order to keep them in a state of

[246 cont.]

[648] [721] This same year 200 tents of Turkmen, who had been living with the Kalmuks for a long time, fled beyond the Yaik /Ural River/, and after the Kazaks had allowed to enter their territories they enslaved the fugitives and divided them among themselves.

[167] [439] [579] During the first years of the reign of Catherine, Russia's relations with the Kazaks were directed more than ever toward the two ends which she had in view: the first, to establish settlements in the two hordes; the second, to insure the inviolability of the caravans.

[361] For the first point, it was wished to revive the plan to build a strong city at the mouth of the Emba and to build a house there for Khan Nurali. But since his subjects feared to see the Russians in the middle of their steppes it was ordered to build a camp in the form of a redoubt instead of a fortress, to shelter the fishermen who came into this region. And in order to keep this establishment from even scaring the nomads, it was ordered that a market be opened where they could provide themselves with wheat from the crown at the lowest price. It was also wished to teach [177] them to [247] mow hay and to build sheds for their animals and dwellings for themselves if they asked for it. Likewise orders were repeated to the border authorities to build sheds for the animals and houses for those Kazaks who wished it on the Irtysh River and beyond the Ural. Taking advantage of the consent of a small number of Kazaks, the Siberian authorities, who had the advantage of living in good relations with certain Kazaks, were ordered to build an entire village on the small Kolchakly River and to obtain for it every imaginable advantage. In a word, the government tried every possible means to imbue its nomadic subjects with a taste for sedentary life. But they always had, and still have today, an invincible aversion to it, either as a result of their [181] nomadic life or for fear of losing their savage liberty, which they value above every kind of possession.

[439] [579] For the second goal, the security of trade, it was necessary to seek new means, for 30 years of experience had proven that neither the khans nor the sultans could offer the caravans a sure and inviolable protection over the entire extent of their territories.

[249 cont.]
father's aims. It was only necessary to know whether the creation of a deputy of the khan would not make the Kazaks discontented and whether they might not refuse to recognize their future chief. It was also necessary to know what [250] Ishim's personal inclinations toward Russia were and whether this novelty might not lead to some unpleasant consequences for her. It was ordered that research be made at the horde itself on all these points and that the results be sent to Petersburg. The authorities in Orenburg replied that according to the custom of the Kazaks, the position of khan should pass to one of his brothers after the death of Nurali and not to one of his sons. The Minister answered that the law of succession in private life could not be applied to succession to the title of khan, because this title always passed from one man to another by the choice of the people. Nevertheless it was decided, in order to avoid grumbling and dissension, to induce the Kazaks to choose Sultan Ishim themselves as the deputy of the khan and to confirm the choice of the people afterwards.

While studies were being made on this subject and the correspondence continued, the year 1771 arrived and the desertion of the Kalmuks caused the Kazaks matters to be forgotten, not only by the government but by the Kazaks themselves, as we will see later. This is why Khan Nurali's plan to elevate his son to the post of his deputy remained unfulfilled.

He could have attained his end if the death of his son, who arrived in Orenburg in 1769 where he was held as hostage, had not grieved him sorely and had not driven him into a stubbornness which was forgivable for a father but unpleasant for the Russian government. It was the second son he had lost in Orenburg, and both had died as children. Attributing their deaths to lack of care, he did not wish under any circumstances to give up another child of his own as hostage. And he himself refused to come to Orenburg, although he was invited to come several times by the authorities for conferences. Certain quarrels which arose between him and his brothers increased his troubles. The envy caused by the marks of attention given them by the Russian government, by using them more than it did him in its relations with the Little

K [250 cont.]
K 648 Horde, and with greater success, and finally the vexation of his
[152 [251] own weakness, all troubled him and removed his power to
578] act with coolness. Having aroused his arrogance, the court of
K Petersburg rejected the thought it had had of increasing his power
[661] over the Kazaks, a measure which had once been thought indispensable. Thus Nurali came to the point where he began to be given less consideration. In spite of his brothers' quarrels with him, they were sent sabers as a reward for their zeal, and his request for stipends fixed by the year were put aside. He was even refused permission to send deputies to Petersburg. It was directed to pay no attention to his obstinacy on the matter of the hostage and to say to him always that Russia would know how to maintain the Kazaks in obedience without that (1). The same

1. Ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of March 16, 1770.

thing was written that year to Sultan Ablai, who, in the hopes of receiving several advantages and privileges from Russia, offered to give up one of his sons as hostage, but later, after he saw that most of his demands could not be satisfied, he refused on fantastic pretexts to carry out what he himself had proposed.

K [721] The renewal of the raids on the Orenburg border by the Little Horde in 1770 was about to bring still another punishment (2)

2. Reinsdorf, the governor of Orenburg, received on January 10, 1771 an order from the Empress to send troops into the Kazak steppe in order to punish the bandits and free the prisoners.

x K 648 ●167 EK KO 648 167 upon them by the Russian government, which they were fortunate enough to avoid only because of the desertion of the Volga Kalmuks, which gave affairs a new turn. This change gave a new destination to the Russian troops, who had been enemies of the Kazaks and now became their allies. We will now give the history of

European Kalmyk RF4
Kalmyk (Oirat) AH5

K 648 [67]

[251 cont.]

EK KO 648 [67]

that event (3). The land of the Kalmuks, or, more precisely,

KO EK [114]

3. We regard it our duty to inform our readers that the description of the flight of the Torguts and the battle they fought with the Kazaks is drawn from two good sources: the first from the journal of Captain Rychkov, who was sent with the Russian troops in pursuit of the fugitives, under the command of [252] General Traubenberg; the second, the description of that flight by the Chinese prince Tsichi [Ch'i Shih?], a work whose translation we owe to Mr. Lipovtsov (see the Siberian News /Sibirskii Vestnik?/ of 1820).

of the Torguts, [252] whose bands are nomadizing today on the right bank of the Volga, in the Astrakhan government, were located in the present territories of China in the west. They left them because of the constant attacks of their neighbors, the Dzungars, whose power had not ceased to grow from the beginning of the 17th century and who threatened to subjugate them entirely. The lack of forces with which to avenge themselves upon their enemies and the fear of one day becoming their slaves led the Torguts to leave their old territories and to withdraw to the west.

In 1636 they came into Russia, and Tsar Michael Fedorovich accepted them among his subjects, giving them the vast lands on the two shores of the Volga as pasture land.

After the conquest of Dzungaria by the Chinese in 1756 and the destruction of most of its inhabitants, the weak survivors, numbering 10,000 tents, all composed of the Derbet, Khoit, and Khoshut descent lines, remembered their compatriots on the Volga, and forgetting their old emnity, they joined them, under the command of Sheren, one of the most zealous companions-at-arms of the Dzungarian prince, Amursan, whose acquaintance we have already seen.

European Kalmyk RF4
Kalmyks (Oirat) AHE

K 648 [721 186] EK KO 648 [721 186]

[254 cont.]

ancestors, they hastened out to fight against them and despoil them. In less than a month the Kazak hordes were under arms, and the entire length of the country, from the shores of the Yaik to the borders of China, was covered with bands of warriors waiting impatiently for the appearance of a people whom the Kazaks burned to immolate for injuries suffered and for the hatred they aroused simply by their name and their origin. Nurali replied to the letter patent that he was not only ready to comply [255] with the wishes of the Russian government but that he was already on the march with his subjects against the fugitives. At the same time news was received that Ablai and his horde were ready for combat. Aichuvak and other sultans wrote in the same vein, and Kaip, who had been khan of Khiva and who lived within the Little Horde after his expulsion by his subjects, promised to join the Russian troops. East of the Kazak steppes, the Kalmuks were awaited by the Sultans Abulfenz, son of Abulkhair Khan, and Erali, sultan of the Great Horde, and finally by the savage Kirgiz, or Buruts, who surpassed all the neighboring peoples in daring and ferociousness.

EK KO K [721 167]

What a terrible series of battles the Torguts had to endure! What a succession of attacks, murders, and robberies occurred on their route all the way to their destination on the banks of the Ili, traveling not with an army always ready to fight, but taking along with them their wives, children, herds, and all their possessions!

Several detachments of Russian troops were immediately detailed to restrain the Kazaks, but various circumstances prevented them from acting in a manner which corresponded to the hope of the government. From then on all hope was lost of seizing the Kalmuks, and the arming of all the Kazak hordes served only to exterminate a large part of the Torguts, without contributing in any way to their return to Russia.

The first barrier which should have been opposed to them was the army of the Ural (Yaik) Cossacks, whose lands they crossed. After the Kalmuks had passed, the Cossacks were firmly ordered to pursue them, but they rebelled and openly refused to leave their homes.

K
648
[721
167]
EK
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648
[721
167]

[255 cont.]

A second detachment was composed of Orenburg Cossacks. They entered the Kazak steppe and joined Khan Nurali in the first half of February. But their horses were so exhausted by the lack of fodder that this [256] detachment remained in the rear and was finally forced to pass into Russia.

Regular troops were detailed to replace them. But the same lack of forage in the steppes beyond the Ural River during the winter and the loss of precious time in correspondence and preparations prevented this corps under the command of Major General Traubenberg from leaving the fortress of Orsk until April 12. He was directed to join Khan Nurali and to await the Kalmuks on the Irtysh, but he did not reach this river until they were already on the Turgai. Having thus lost the opportunity of action in any other way than against the rear of the fugitives, the Russians who had joined the troops of Nurali (1) and Kaip (2) marched swiftly

1. On this occasion Nurali paraded his devotion to Russia in the presence of the commander of the Russian troops and complained of the fact that they had not asked his help in the Prussian War or the one against Turkey.

2. Nurali effected his meeting with the Russian troops near the Aksakal Barbi lakes, and Kaip did so on the Karaganly-Turgai, 754 versts /805 km./ from the fort of Orsk.

in pursuit of the Torguts. Near the Ulu-Tau Mountains famine and bad water caused swelling ailments to spread among the soldiers, and the horses tired and began to die in large numbers. Meanwhile the fugitives were moving farther and farther away, and the impossibility of reaching them became more evident every day. Finally, General Traubenberg was obliged to turn from the east to the north and to return into Russia by the fort of Uisk, which was the nearest point on the border.

European KalmyK RF4
KalmyKS (first) AN5
CossacKS RD2

xK 648 [721 167] [256 cont.] The Kazaks alone could not seize the Kalmuks, and they did not need to. The aim of their cooperation was better accomplished by their endless and repeated attacks, their pillaging and the capture of a large number of prisoners. Sultan Aichuvak routed one section on the Sagiz. Nurali delivered a violent blow to another section toward the east, and he also carried off several victories over them near the Mugodzhar Hills and on the Ishim River. Ablai [257] fought them with constant success. In some regions he acted in accord with Sultan Abulfenz, and their united forces caused immense losses to the Kalmuks, especially through the number of prisoners they took.

Erali, sultan of the Great Horde and at the same time paladin of the court of Peking, invited Ablai to join him against the Kalmuks several times. The latter refused to aid him, but this did not stop him from carrying out the plan he had devised. Erali found other allies and caused the fugitives to undergo enormous losses in men, animals, and personal belongings. We saw the details of this event in the historical account of the Great Horde.

When they were finally free of the Kazaks, the Kalmuks fell into the hands of the Buruts, and the misfortunes which the latter inflicted upon them were much worse than those they had suffered previously, particularly with regard to losses in prisoners. The Buruts, who were as greedy as they were ferocious, pursued them all the way to the Chinese border, to the new line established on the lands of the Dzungars. Ubashi crossed this line, not as he had imagined when he left the Volga as an independent sovereign, but as a humble subject who wished to save his life. He brought to China less than half of the Kalmuks who left Russia with him, the rest having perished en route.

K 648 669 662 C 648 669 662 In 1773 and 1774 Pugachev's revolt caused violent agitation in the provinces in the southeast of Russia. The lands washed by the Ural River, almost from its source to its mouth, were most exposed to this, because the Yaik Cossacks were the first accomplices of the false Peter, and the Bashkirs were his first allies. The troops forming the border guard assembled in the principal forts to defend them against the rebels, and the borders remained

[274 cont.]
course of these two years fewer prisoners were taken on the border than in the 13 years from 1782 to 1794 (2). Likewise,

2. As proof, we include here the following table for these 13 years. Along the line which extends from the fort of Zverinogolovsk to Guryev, the Kazaks took 34 prisoners in 1782.

21	"	" 1783
176	"	" 1784
175	"	" 1785
12	"	" 1786
2	"	" 1787
43	"	" 1788
53	"	" 1789
90	"	" 1790
34	"	" 1791
40	"	" 1792
60	"	" 1793
42	"	" 1794

in 1786 his subjects released quite a large number of Russians from slavery, up to the time Nurali was banished from the horde after Ufa had been fixed as his place of exile and the detention of his brother Aichuvak at Uralsk. That same year 45,000 tents spent the winter inside the Russian borders and crossed the Ural River again in the spring without permitting the slightest infraction of the peace.

The first effects of the new system of administration of the Little Horde could not fail to be pleasing [275] both to the Empress, who ardently desired to establish order among the Kazaks, and to the supreme commander of the border, who was approaching the goal indicated to him by the advice of his sovereign and who saw the possibility of pleasing her by insuring the prosperity of an entire people. Occupied with these thoughts,

[289 cont.]

[648] During the winter of 1797-98, a strong detachment of Ural Cossacks [726] crossed the Ural River and not only defeated the robbers but in exchange for the studs which had been taken from them in Russia, [727] they carried off several thousands of horses, which were distributed to those who had suffered losses. Shortly afterward they were attacked by the Bashkirs, who took 5,000 horses from them.

It can be imagined that the Kazaks did not leave these two losses unavenged. The result was new raids, new reprisals, and new insults from one side and the other. In order to put an end to these disturbances, commissions were established on the borders composed of deputies of the Bashkir, Kazak, and Kalmuk peoples, as well as the Ural and Orenburg Cossacks. These commissions were supposed to examine the complaints which came to them from all sides and to satisfy them as much as possible, as well as to try to suppress permanently demands which were unjust or impossible to satisfy.

[290] These commissions did not fulfill the object of their meeting, and indeed scarcely set about satisfying the duties imposed on them, for no one appeared at the tribunal.

[167] At this time many Kazaks from different hordes asked to establish themselves permanently in Russia. Their requests were answered in an ukase of September 30, 1797, as a consequence of which 12,000 tents of the Middle Horde alone are settled down in various localities to this day.

[646] After Ishim's death the government of the Little Horde was entrusted to a council composed of Sultan Aichuvak, son of Abulkhair, as president, and six councilors, two from each tribe. They were all chosen by Baron Igelstrom, who was then commanding the Orenburg border area for the second time and had once [647] again given the government the idea of maintaining the Kazaks without the intermediary of a khan. When Emperor Paul had sent a confirmation of his demands, he chose the Khobda River as the [646] permanent residence of the council and had it opened in this region by the mufti Mohammed Djan Hussein, who was sent from Orenburg in 1797. The councilors took an oath of loyalty and swore to carry out their duties zealously, and the mufti remained with them

[291 cont.]
descent lines of the Middle Horde and chose to live much farther to the east than the former. Others withdrew to the mouth of the Syr[Darya], and after overthrowing the Karakalpaks, they chose Sultan Abulgazi Kaip as khan.

A third group attacked the Turkmen, and after forcing them to give up part of their lands, they occupied a large part of the isthmus which separates the Aral Sea from the Caspian Sea. Aichuvak himself and several sultans with [292] him were obliged to cross the Ural River to save their lives and to remain in Russia until this general fermentation was calmed.

Sultan Bukei, son of Nurali, who had had the place of president in the council of the khan, did the same, but he followed a different course. He lived near the border of the government of Astrakhan, and knowing that after the departure of the Kalmuks, many lands had remained deserted which were suitable for pasturage, he decided in 1799 to leave forever the steppes beyond the Ural River and to go over into the territory called Ryn Peski. Having decided thus and hoping to become an independent khan soon, Bukei addressed himself to General Knorring, the governor general of Georgia and Astrakhan, begging for permission to occupy the lands he had chosen between the Ural and the Volga and the freedom to transport there the Kazaks in his auls, while assigning him 100 Cossacks with their officers in order to maintain order.

It was impossible to neglect a proposal which was so advantageous and so useful. Governor Knorring brought it to the attention of Emperor Paul, who, by an ukase of March 11, 1801, commanded that it be put into execution.

Without losing time, Bukei prepared to move into Russia about the autumn of that same year. The Kazaks who followed him belonged mostly to the Baiulin descent line. There were few of the Alimul line and almost none from that of the Semirod. All of them together comprised about 10,000 tents. Once they had occupied the Ryn Peski, they promptly became a clear and striking demonstration of the effects of a peaceful life. While their compatriots beyond the Ural River, ruined and exhausted by their

[294 cont.]

very peaceful. To the south there is once again the Great Horde, or the subjects of what is now the khanate of Kokand, including the people of Tashkent, Turkestan, etc., who are little accustomed to war and little inclined to make raids upon the Kazak peoples. With these neighbors, the Middle Horde was exposed only to the attacks of the Bashkirs, who bordered it on the side of the fort of Troitsk, and to those of the Buruts in the south. But the extent to which these peoples could do damage was so small compared to the expanse of its lands, that one must admit the advantages of its geographical position over that of the Little Horde and to conclude therefore that it was much less troubled than the latter from the outside.

Having clarified our first thought, we believe it is also very simple to explain the second. For there is no doubt that a people which is less often obliged to defend itself against outside attack and less frequently prompted to wreak vengeance acquires milder habits than a people which is always doing battle with its enemies. We will note, in addition, that the khans and sultans of the Middle Horde always had more power and influence over their subjects than those of the Little Horde. In this connection the long administration of Ablai, first as sultan and later as khan, was particularly useful.

The Kazaks who followed Ablai became accustomed under him to peace and the obedience which one can expect from a half-savage people, and they remained peaceful under his son Wali, although his khan did not have his father's talent for gaining the general respect. On the other hand, however, he made a show of never seeking the protection of Russia, paid no attention to the demands of the authorities of the Siberian borders, refused to surrender the Turkmen who had fled with the Kalmuks from the government of Astrakhan and who were later held by Ablai, and finally he persecuted the elders who were devoted to Russia. In 1789 a large number of people who were considered [295] his subjects crossed over into Russia with Tugum, sultan of the Great Horde, in order to establish themselves permanently there, and they received lands near the fort of Ust-Kamenogorsk for their settlement.

RQ2 Kazak RQ2
Kalmyk AH5

KK. /146 cont./
175 Dzungarians however, would not permit the Russians to estab-
648 lish themselves there. In spite of the fact that Buchholz was accompanied by a considerable detachment (3,000 men), they besieged him and forced him to retreat with great losses to the mouth of the Om and to renounce his aim. Only five years later, with the consent of the Dzungarians, the Russians did succeed in founding several fortresses along the Irtysh (Omsk, Staro-Semipalatinsk, and Ust-Kamenogorsk).

K As we have seen, in 1723 the Dzungarians defeated a
175 part of the Elder and Middle Hordes of the Kirghiz /Kazak/
648 (wandering west of them). The Younger Horde and the part of
167 the Middle Horde that remained independent moved northwest
KK. to the Siberian border of the Russians and to the Bashkir. Mean-
175 while the khans Abulkhair and Semeke swore allegiance to the
648 Russians in order to protect themselves better from the Dzungarians.

KK It was during this period that the kingdom of Dzungaria reached its
175 greatest power and might, extending from the Altai across the
631 southern part of the present Semipalatinsk, Akmolinsk, and
648 Turgai oblasts to the Aral Sea, and southward to the foothills of the Tien Shan. In 1739 the Dzungarians attacked the Kirghiz /Kazak/ and drove them to the Ural (Yaik) River, in the course of which many Bashkir who were subject to the Russians were killed. The Russian government, however, decided not to punish the Dzungarians for the attack, for it still recognized them as a powerful enemy. These Dzungarian kontayshi considered themselves so powerful that they paid no heed to good relations with their strong neighbors -- China and Russia. Only after /147/ clan dissensions once again arose in Dzungaria did its power fall, this time finally, and the Chinese and Russians did not fail to take advantage of it. In 1751 the kontaysha Amursana was seeking to rule Dzungaria. Since he had no hope of achieving his aim by his own power, he turned to the Chinese government for help. The latter, expecting to gain an advantage from the war which was beginning, sent an army to Amursana, which did indeed help him to gain rule. Instead of acknowledging

RQ2 Kazak RQ2
Prehistoric Kalmyk AH5 Turkestan RL3

KK 175 631 648 /147 cont./ himself as dependent upon China after that, however, Amursana took advantage of the trust of the Chinese and attacked them suddenly and laid waste the nearest provinces (Hami). The indignant emperor declared war without quarter against the Dzungarians. Chinese armies entered Dzungaria several times, only to be met with defeat. In fact Amursana was finally beaten only in 1756, when he fled to Siberia to the Russians. The Chinese went through all of Dzungaria "with fire and sword" destroying almost the entire population without quarter (up to one million persons), paying no attention to sex or age. This was no conquest, but the extermination of a nation, individual by individual. And in truth, from this time on the Dzungarian kingdom completely disappeared from the scene of history. Only a few thousand people of the western Oliut /or Olyut/ tribes escaped, managing to flee to the Kalmyk hordes on the Volga.

KK [167]

With the destruction of the Dzungarian empire, in the southern strip of the present Kirghiz krai, there remained the Kirghiz-Kazak (the Elder, Middle, and Younger hordes), some of whom recognized Russian authority and some of whom went over to the Chinese. By the beginning of the 19th century, as we have seen, most of the Kirghiz /Kazak/ recognized the authority of the Russians and remained to wander in the southern part of our region (where they are still wandering to this day).

K 175 648 [619] [167]

Such, in brief, is the political history of the nomadic peoples of the Kirghiz krai.

P.T. 172 Clearly the Kirghiz krai has not ceased to be the arena of important historic events from the most ancient times to the end of the 19th century. Primitive tribes appeared here and passed through the first stages of their cultural development (the stone and copper stages). Dozens of peoples of Central, Inner, and Eastern Asia moved through here, for which reason the southern plains of the region are even known as the "historical gates of peoples." The various monuments found here in the region are mute evidence of the events which have taken place here in various epochs. We have already seen the

S:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

BRIEF

The Kazakhs, one of the major Turkic peoples in the USSR, live in a strategic area in the heart of Soviet Central Asia. There are evidences of deep and continuing conflict between their way of life and the policies imposed upon them by the Soviet Communists. This study was intended to describe these sources of conflict and to indicate their implications for psychological warfare. A secondary objective of the study was to determine how well the vulnerabilities of a people inaccessible to direct methods of research can be assessed.

The traditional Kazakh way of life is pastoral nomadism; they abhor the settled farming life. Their customs and values reflect this independent heritage, and the Soviet drive during the 1930's to collectivize the nomads met with resistance. Between 1926 and 1939, the Kazakhs suffered a net population loss of almost one million--nearly one-fourth of their number in 1926. This loss was the result of starvation and disease, mass arrests and liquidations, flight across the border, and migration to neighboring Turkic peoples and to the urban and industrial areas of Siberia, all factors indirectly attributable to the imposition of Soviet control.

The organization of Kazakh society according to kin groups has been an important factor in contact with the Soviets. It has eased Kazakh transition to collective life, since most collective farms comprise single groups of blood relatives, but at the same time the closeness of the family ties has frequently led to the charge of nepotism by the Soviets.

The nativistic revival of Kazakh interest in their traditional heroes and customs was encouraged by the Soviets as a wartime morale measure. This revival--at once political, religious, and cultural in nature--became so strong that the Soviets considered it a threat and have attempted to suppress it. The importance of blood ties to the Kazakhs heightened their resentment of Soviet condemnation of their national heroes, whom they regard also as their ancestors. The Kazakhs' veneration of their past history and culture is fostered by their native religion, a blend of ancestor worship and shamanism. This folk religion is not formally organized. Administratively, the Soviets treat the Kazakhs as Moslems, although it is difficult to say how much Islam has influenced the rural Kazakhs.

The Kazakhs appear to be making only a minimal contribution to important republic activities which the Soviets are trying to encourage--industry and transport, Party and government. One explanation may be that the Kazakhs are not given equal opportunities; there is some evidence that the Slavs regard them as inferiors. Another reason is that the Kazakhs are not coming forward for training and advancement. Apparently they prefer to keep apart from the Slavic population of the republic; this conclusion is supported by the low rate of intermarriage between the two peoples. The Kazakhs appear to be opposed to many aspects of Sovietization, but at present their resistance is largely passive.

The local press proved to be a most useful source of information in the present study. The reports of local reactions and activities in relation to the official Party line provided many indications of strengths and weaknesses, trouble spots and failures. In addition to this source, research methods from many disciplines were combined to utilize all available data and information.

Soviet border as a sieve; it is not, and at present movement out of Soviet Central Asia to the surrounding countries is difficult. But it is not impossible. Archeologists in northern Iran have reported the presence of individuals who were obviously natives of Central Asia but plainly not of local origin. It was explained to one of the archeologists that these newcomers were on a pilgrimage to Mecca.

In recent years articles have referred to a flow in the opposite direction. The Ismaelian sect of Islam has had a strong and faithful following among the tribes of the Pamir Mountains for many centuries. Collectors of tribute in postwar years have appeared in southern Tadzhikistan to collect the age-old due, and this practice has been the subject of complaint in the local newspapers.

On a broader scale, there have been flights from the Soviet Union into all the surrounding countries. During the 1930's, over 30,000 Kazakhs appeared in Outer Mongolia, a region in which few Kazakhs previously had lived. There they remain to this day. Untold numbers of Kazakhs fled across to Sinkiang; some made a second trek, from Sinkiang to Kashmir, when the agents of Mao Tse-tung appeared in the Chinese province.

Thousands have migrated from the Soviet Union to Afghanistan, their number increasing steadily from the 1920's through the 1940's. The Afghan government at first announced a protective policy toward these migrants, but this policy was never put into practice and recently it has been officially revoked. As a result the people suffer as much outside the Soviet Union as they had within; there is much unrest, and many return to the USSR. Suffering and unrest are evident in Iran as well, although the flow has not been as noticeable there; strangers lose themselves more easily in Iran than in Afghanistan.

Here is a vast field for fruitful work. These migrant peoples are potential sources of information; they are channels of communication into and out of the Soviet Union. Extensive interviewing and survey work among these groups could reap rich rewards.

THE PERIOD 1926-1939

K 171 649 361 474

At the end of the 1920's the Soviets decided to collectivize the nomads of Central Asia, by which they meant causing them to settle down in collective farms. The first Five-Year Plan envisaged settling 383,000 of these nomadic households by 1933. By 1930, 50,000 nomadic Kazakh households were so immobilized, but 567,000 out of 829,000 households, or 67 per cent, were still nomadic. During the following year, 95,000 more households were transferred from nomadism to farming and other sedentary occupations. In 1932 an intensive drive was started to collectivize the nomadic herdsmen as well, but without compulsory sedentarization; collectivization no longer meant settling down.

K [181] [554]

Apparently, many of those nomads who had been sedentarized in the first Five-Year Plan did not remain on the farms. Kazakhs traditionally abhorred farming. They regarded it as woman's work, as work of the poor and of those who could not make a success of herding. For a man to become a farmer meant loss of status, loss of manhood and virility. The Sarts, for example, a farming and trading people of Central Asia composed of former herdsmen, were despised by the nomads. Only half of those households which had been announced as collectivized remained so. In 1934, it was announced that only 76,000 households of the 145,000 noted above had been permanently settled in 1932. Between 1933 and 1935 slightly under 200,000 households were added to this roll, making a total of about one quarter of a million households which had been sedentarized. In addition, there was some movement of nomad households across the border into other republics or into China. In 1935 there were 158,000 fully nomadic Kazakh households, as compared with 567,000 five years earlier.

K [186]

K [169]

The total number of those employed in Kazakhstan in 1931 was 495,100, of whom 125,100 were in agriculture. By 1935 the total figure had risen to 585,700, and the agricultural component to 165,800. The total figure rose to about 700,000 in 1937 and to 820,000 in 1940.

KN [162]

There were 16,184 persons employed in industry in Kazakhstan in 1927, of whom 20.8 per cent were Kazakhs. In 1933, the number of industrial workers had risen to 56,484; of these, 23,784, or 42.1 per cent, were Kazakhs. At the end of 1934, the total was 71,627, of whom 29,022 or 40.5 per cent were Kazakhs.

K 161

The total population of Kazakhs was reported in 1926 as 3,968,289; in 1939 their number was given as 3,098,764. They had thus lost in absolute terms about 900,000 people between the two censuses, or approximately 22 per cent of their number in 1926. In the same period, the population of the entire USSR had increased by 15.9 per cent. It has been argued that under normal conditions the Kazakh rate of increase would have been higher than the average for the USSR as a whole. (The populations of the neighboring republics of Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan, for instance, which are composed of ethnic groups similar to the Kazakhs, have increased at a rate much higher than that of the entire USSR.) At any rate, if the Kazakhs had increased only at the USSR average rate, they would have numbered about 4,500,000 in 1939. Thus their real loss

161 may be estimated at approximately 1,400,000, if one adds to the actual loss of 900,000 the expected natural increase of 500,000.

648 A number of arguments have been advanced to account for both the actual and the estimated losses. Each has a certain merit, and no single one of them should be pursued at the expense of all the others.

[167] The Soviet explanation is that people from Kazakhstan moved away to the new industrial enterprises of the southern Urals and southern Siberia and to the neighboring Central Asia republics, the Uzbek, Tadzhik, Turkmen, and Kirgiz SSR's. This interpretation has not been accompanied by any data. The figures quoted here have been the totals of those listed as Kazakhs in the USSR censuses regardless of place of residence. Therefore, the Soviet statement must mean not only that hundreds of thousands of Kazakhs migrated from Kazakhstan to other parts of the USSR, but also that they gave up their Kazakh nationality in doing so.

[177] This may be part of the story but it cannot be the whole. It is known that the Russians looked with favor on the Russification of native populations and their absorption into the Russian ethnic group, regardless of their forebears. German and Austrian prisoners of war who were sent to Kazakhstan report that many Kazakhs, identifiable by their physiognomy, by their personal and family names, and by their own account of 161 their past, were nevertheless designated Russian in their official papers. 648 But certainly 900,000 of them did not become Russian.

[494] During the course of collectivization many Kazakhs were liquidated by the GPU, primarily during the period between the two censuses. [565] Those liquidated were people who resisted collectivization, but they were listed as remnants of the former nobility and wealthy people of Kazakhstan. This class was known as the feudal bays. About 700 bay families per year were liquidated, that is turned over to the GPU, during the three-year period 1928-1930. In 1931 it was announced that 23,000 households of bays were to be liquidated. This made an announced total of 25,000 households subject to GPU measures. If all these people were actually liquidated (that is, left to starve or otherwise badly treated), then some 125,000 Kazakhs were eliminated by these means. This is the largest figure for population losses that can be assigned to police measures on the basis of published data.

[233] [162] It has been stated that between 1930 and 1935, at the height of the drive for collectivization, the number of Kazakh households engaged in the traditional herding occupation dropped from 567,000 to 158,000. Many of these households went into agriculture and some into industry [167] in Kazakhstan, but others moved across the border, either into neighboring republics or out of the Soviet realm into bordering China. During the 1920's and the first part of the 1930's considerable cross-border movement was still permitted into China and back, according to age-old nomadic patterns. The border was closed in the mid-1930's, and possibly some Kazakhs remained outside the USSR by choice; for example, there is a colony of approximately 30,000 Kazakhs in Outer Mongolia. However, to assign numbers to the population loss in Soviet Kazakhstan through this cross-border movement is a hopeless task.

Again, no reliable estimate has been given for the number of Kazakhs who might have gone over to the neighboring republics within the Soviet Union.

the Soviet Union. Traditionally, peoples of Central Asia were able to leave their native pastures when times were bad and claim hospitality among other more fortunate Turkic groups. Instances have been reported in the 19th and 20th centuries of groups of Kazakhs whose herds had been depleted through drought or plague doing this; some even joined Uzbek groups, on the basis of descent from a common ancestor. Such an argument would hold only for the Uzbeks, the Kirgiz, and the Karakalpaks. It is not applicable to the Tadzhiks, and certainly not to the Russians. According to a long-established cultural pattern, Kazakhs who leave herding for farming join another group, such as Sart, for example, or Karakalpak, according to the area in which they have settled.

The general consideration of shifts in ethnic identification raises the problem of the smaller peoples of Central Asia. Aside from the many millions of Kazakhs, Uzbeks, and Kirgiz, there are various small groups, none of which number more than fifty-odd thousand. These smaller groups, who together number about one quarter of a million people, have suffered the same fate of cultural levelling, absorption, and elimination of cultural differences that has taken place throughout the Soviet world from the Caucasus to the Bering Sea. The cost of administering many small peoples is too great a luxury for the USSR to afford; the Soviets have ceased to regard these peoples as independent entities, and have awarded the highest honors to those ethnologists who have justified the formation of ever larger groups of peoples.

In 1926 more than 200,000 Kazakhs lived within the 1939 boundaries of Uzbekistan, exclusive of the Karakalpak ASSR, and 86,000 Kazakhs were living in what is today Karakalpakia. The Karakalpaks are a people closely related to the Kazakhs; they are in the main Kazakhs who a few centuries ago settled down to farming. They still maintain strong ethnic ties to the Kazakhs, and linguistically are barely distinguishable from them. The Karakalpaks increased from 146,000 to 186,000 between 1926 and 1939, an increase of 27 per cent and the highest gain of all the Central Asiatic peoples during that period. Part of this gain may have been due to the decision of Kazakhs to declare themselves Karakalpaks, or the decision of the census authorities to list the Kazakhs as Karakalpaks. The latter alternative is implausible, because it would have the Soviets contributing further to a population picture of the Kazakhs which was already unfavorable. Marxist theory rejects the capitalistic Malthusian concept, and extreme population losses are embarrassing for the Communists to explain.

From 1929 to 1933 the total livestock in Kazakhstan dropped from nearly 40,000,000 to 5,000,000 head. This was a disastrous blow to the nomads. The number of sheep and goats dropped by about 90 per cent. More than two-thirds of the horses and three-quarters of the cattle died in those years; between 1930 and 1933 more than 90 per cent of the camels died. Without these animals, the nomads cannot live. The farmer can store his grain, but the nomad can store food only on the hoof. When a head of stock dies on the steppes either it is eaten or it rots. The nomad's staple is milk, which he cannot store. These losses in livestock give some idea of the starvation conditions which prevailed during 1930-1933. Hundreds of thousands of nomads must either have

died or changed their way of life. This fact lies behind the great drop in the number of Kazakh nomadic households, from 567,000 in 1930 to one-fourth that amount, 158,000, in 1935.

It will be recalled that between 1926 and 1939 the Kazakh population suffered an absolute loss of 900,000, and a projected loss of 1,400,000, figured on the 15.9 average rate of increase for the entire Soviet Union. The major factors which contributed to this decline may now be summarized:

(1) Starvation through loss of herds during the period of the first great collectivization drive, 1929-1933.
(2) The poor conditions of life and the prevalence of famine and disease during the early period of collectivization.
(3) Mass arrests and liquidations of resisters to collectivization ("enemies of the people").
(4) Border crossings by Kazakhs into Sinkiang and Mongolia.
(5) Kazakh migration to the neighboring Turkic peoples, primarily the Karakalpaks and the Uzbeks.
(6) Russification of Kazakhs who moved to the new urban developments of southern Siberia.

The population losses in any single category cannot be estimated with accuracy; one can only list those factors contributing to population loss with comments about their relative significance. The major factor was undoubtedly starvation through loss of herds and through the conditions attending collectivization. The flight across the borders into countries outside the USSR is a dramatic factor, but not one which accounts for large numbers. There are no signs of a great increase in the population of Sinkiang, for example, in the early 1930's. The total population of Sinkiang is small, and an influx of hundreds of thousands of people could not have passed unnoticed, especially since there were western observers in the area at the time.

The movement of Kazakhs into the cities of southern Siberia, presumably in the Urals and the Kuzbass, is the official Russian explanation. This explanation cannot be the whole story but must be accepted as a part of the truth. That is, Kazakhs who are urbanized, speak Russian habitually, and work in Russian factories seek a Russian nationality listing. They have been encouraged to do so at certain periods of Soviet history, primarily in the 1930's.

The factor of GPU arrests and liquidation, together with attendant factors such as starvation among those who were not themselves liquidated but whose herds were, may account for a maximum of 125,000 Kazakhs. The last major factor is the flight of Kazakhs to other neighboring nationalities. A minor factor related to this last is the low rate of increase among those Kazakhs resident in areas outside Kazakhstan.

KAZAKH POPULATION IN 1939

A total of 3,100,000 Kazakhs was listed for the USSR as a whole in the 1939 census. Approximately 84 per cent were resident in Kazakhstan, nearly 10 per cent lived in Uzbekistan and Karakalpakia, and the rest

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2
Kazakhstan RQ1

K KN 231 K [D69]

The figures for the number of sheep are particularly significant, since this animal is of central importance to the nomad. Mutton is virtually the nomad's only meat; sheep milk is used as much as cow or mare milk. The sheep herds did not recover from the losses of the early 1930's as well as the cattle; by 1949, the number of sheep was 15,000,000, or approximately 68 per cent of the 1929 peak. In 1953, according to a statement made by Khrushchev,[1] secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the number of sheep and goats was significantly less than it had been in 1928, the index year for current Soviet statistics on Kazakh livestock. In 1928, the number of sheep and goats had been 20,500,000, with a ratio of four sheep to one goat; hence there were approximately 16,000,000 sheep. It would appear, then, that the number of sheep has not increased since 1949; it may possibly have decreased.

KN [167]

The figures reported for the number of hogs in Kazakhstan provide a useful index of the degree to which Slavic farmers (Russian and Ukrainian) have moved into the republic. The pig is of European origin; it is not native to rural Turkestan and was introduced there only recently. There were 300,000 hogs in Kazakhstan in 1924 and 1929, 500,000 in 1927, and 370,000 in 1938—the only category in which a figure for the 1930's exceeds any of those for the previous decade. Kazakhs have never eaten pork, partly on religious grounds—it is taboo for Moslems—and partly on traditional grounds. The present-day importance of pork in the KSSR economy is shown by the fact that in 1953 it constituted 53 per cent of the total meat production of the republic.[2]

K [D62] [179]

COLLECTIVIZATION

K 197 C48

Of fundamental importance in understanding the Kazakh attitudes toward Sovietization is the impact which collectivization during the late twenties and early thirties had upon these attitudes. During the drive to collectivize the Kazakhs, thousands of families were handed over to the GPU, hundreds of thousands of families starved to death, and further thousands sought to escape the consequences of being identified as Kazakhs by emigrating or declaring themselves to be Uzbeks, Karakalpaks, or other neighboring peoples. (See Chapter 2.)

K [167]

During the period of collectivization, the Party leader of the Kazakh republic, F. I. Goloshchekin, made a number of remarkably frank statements. In a series of articles and speeches prepared between 1928 and 1930, he described how collectivization was accomplished. In November 1928, he stated that 657 households were confiscated, and a total of 143,000 cattle units (whereby five sheep equals one head of cattle) were collectivized.[3] In an article two years later he said that a group of 896 households had been confiscated.[4] Another source reveals that some 700 Kazakh households were confiscated in 1929.[5]

[1] *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 23 Oct 53.
[2] *Ibid.*, 21 Oct 53.
[3] Goloshchekin, 1931, p. 201.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 208.
[5] Kuchkin, 1946.

161 taking techniques were applied. In a more general way, we may derive a rate of net increase of 100 percent per century, which is not unthinkable; nevertheless it must be noted that there is a vast disparity between the accuracy of the 19th century figures prior to the 1897 census, and those of the 1897 and 1926 censuses.

619 The Kazakhs have been divided into three hordes or
175 chief administrative-political units which have been in-
642 dependent of each other since the beginning of the 18th century; these are known as the Great Horde, the Middle Horde and the Little Horde. At the beginning of the 19th century, after the flight of the Kalmuks from the Volga steppes to western China, the territory left free to the east of the Volga was given into the hands of Khan Bukei of the Little Horde. In making this move, under the protection of the Russian government, Khan Bukei formed the Bukei or Inner horde. Thus, during the 19th century there were effectively four hordes of the Kazakhs. The move by Bukei took place during the years 1801-1802,
167 and his followers numbered about 7000 tents.[42] There is evidence of considerable movement in the western steppe in this period, since it is also reported that shortly before some 3200 tents or families of the Kazakhs had submitted to the Russians by crossing the Irtysh and settling there.[43] Again, many of those who had followed

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[42] Levshine, 299-300.

[43] Kostenko, 30.

Khan Bukei in 1801 re-crossed the Ural River and fled the Russians, rejoining the Little Horde, because a rumor had spread among them that the Russians wished to settle them in fixed localities.[44] 167 •

From this we get a picture of constant reshuffling of alignments and the formation of new groupings. There were special forces at work to cause these movements during the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th centuries, namely, the freeing of a great expanse of favorable steppe country by the flight of the Kalmuks, and also the increasing role of Russia in the steppe. Nevertheless it would be false to assume that migrations and alignments such as these were limited to this period. Except during periods of domination by a single great center, such as Chingis Khan or Imperial and Soviet Russia, the peoples of the steppe were constantly in flux. Pressure from the Chinese, local wars, droughts, frosts, floods, epidemics of man and/or beasts--any and all of these could decide a pastoral group to move to a new locality. These are migrations in the strict sense of the term, and are sharply to be distinguished from the normal yearly round of nomadic movement which was a more or less constant phenomenon. Details might vary, but the general readiness of the nomads to move is a constant. Above all, it is interesting to note

[44] Levchine, 300.

167 that motivation to migrate in one case is ascribed to the fear of being forced to settle down.

Kazakh Clan and Lineage: General Considerations

619 It will be recalled that during the 16th and 17th centuries, the Kazakhs were united into one nation, with relatively well-recognized boundaries, under a single ruler. Even though the three component hordes had already been formed during this period, their separation in fact took place only in the 18th century. The resulting triple division was not fixed and permanent. First we note the separation again of the Inner Horde. Again, various tribes and clans were continually leaving and re-joining different hordes. According to Valikhanov, the Little Horde itself was formed by splitting off from the others (probably during the 16th century). Thus according to local tradition, the Great and the Middle hordes are the senior divisions.[45] This tradition supplies us with a datum regarding the over-all dual organization of the steppe societies.

619 Again there was much internal movement, as an in-
167 stance of which the following may be cited: elements of the Kangly, Chaichkly, and Kereit clans of the Great Horde separated from that horde in the 17th century, and nomadized together with the Kongrad clan of the Middle

[45] Valikhanov, 290.

619 167 hordes down through the 19th century.[46] The process of combination and recombination was not restricted to movements inside the Kazakh hordes, they also combined with non-Kazakh Turkic groups of the steppe, but the pattern was different. The clans were groups which usually bore the name of an eponymous ancestor, or recreated the name of an illustrious Turkic or Mongol group of the past days of glory. In both instances, whether through reference to an individual (mythical or actual) or to a group, the consciousness of unity over the course of history, and the affirmation of the unity of that history was asserted. In this way an unmistakable symbol was given to a Turkic clan or people, and its unity, real or fictive, mythological or historical, was established by tradition. Certain names, primarily the most glorious, recur again and again, among the Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Karakalpaks, and so forth, which formed a small reservoir continually tapped. Clans bearing common names recognize an affinity with each other regardless of whether they belong to the same Turkic nation now or not.

619 The relationship established by bearing the name of a common ancestor, or of a previous group of common descent, was a weak one, but was related to certain rights of admission or combination with the distant

[46] Ibid., 286.

[Inner Horde]

619 Khan Bukei[1] was of the highest nobility in the Little
565 Horde: Chingis Khan figured in his genealogy; and his more immediate ancestor some three or four generations back had been Abul-Hafr, the last great Khan whose fame was recognized by all the hordes of the Kazakhs. However, Bukei was not in the direct senior line from Abul-Hafr, and hence was not among the chief rulers of the Little Horde.

161 He and his followers, who were changed in status from a clan some 1500 families strong, to a horde with its independent Khan, increased naturally, through Russian support and the attraction of in-migrants to some 5000 families in five years, lost some groups through defections in the 1820's,[227] but increased steadily until by 1845 they had come to number 30,000 families,[228] which was the same number they had forty years later, 619 in the 1880's. The demographic history of the Inner
● 167 Horde reveals much of the instability of all social formations, clans, lineages, hordes, villages, and even extended families. Migration--as opposed to nomadization--brought about ever new conjunctions and combinations. Clans, villages, etc., had to survive not only the mortal span of their individual members, but the shifting of loyalties and membership affiliations as well.

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[227] Levchine, 300.

[228] Ivanin, 6.

[1] [i.e. the leader of the Inner Horde in the early 19th century. Cf. Cat. 11b, AHI Mongolia, p. 491.--Analyst]

101 (2) why they are separated from the text proper. As
127 to why the Soviet era data are added, it may be said
177 at once that they are marginally Soviet: they were gathered in the 1920's, and from an outlying province where the impact of Soviet acculturation had barely begun; and again, fully recognizing the acculturated life of these people, certain factors have remained constant, "recognizable," from the past, and the data regarding them supplement descriptions of the previous era, fill in old gaps. The resultant picture has historical significance, it tells what happened later; it has comparative significance, it permits the confrontation of Kazakh data with other data, such as the Kalmuk. But the post-revolutionary report is separated from the pre-revolutionary data because of the great changes in the life of the component peoples of the Russian empire.

Clan and Lineage

167 The Kazakhs of the Naiman division are sometimes
101 called a tribe. Adequately detailed genealogical data
175 afford a considerable amount of insight into the struc-
619 ture of the Kazakh clan and lineage. We are faced with a distinction which has been encountered several times in the course of the present study: the distinction between "objective" history and history as mythopoeia. As to the first, Margulanov tells us that these Naiman, in branching off (ramifying, as Firth has put it) from

167 101 175 619 the Naiman corpus, migrated from Turkestan to the Altai region in the period 1750-1770. At this time they attacked the Dzungarian or Western Mongols and occupied their present territory.[257] Moving somewhat southward, to the valley of the Chu River, a portion of these Naiman have been moving back and forth across the Russo-Chinese border; they may have been nomadizing in the valley of the Chu River before 1870, but between about 1870 and 1900 they were in Chinese Turkestan; by 1900 they migrated north and west to the pasture lands where they were reported in 1927 by Samoilovich.[258]

The above data are objective in the sense that they may conceivably be verified; possibly the Dzungarian traditions will report a war over the pasturages in the western portions of the Altai Mountains; possibly Chinese administrative records will show a movement across the borders during the last third of the 19th century; or Russian documents will support this account put together from Margulanov, Samoilovich, Shvetsov and Tynyshpaev. This little historical excursus may be verified, or it may be corrected as to this or that detail; but in any case we indeed have a record which is in every way the stuff that historians deal with. Above all, it is subject to verification, its veracity and credibility may be demonstrated OR disproved.

[257] Margulanov, 330.

[258] Samoilovich, 303.